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ON HUMAN NATURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Stephen P. Marks1
Are people innately good, but corruptible by the forces of evil? Or, are they
instead innately wicked, and redeemable only by the forces of good? People
are both. Edward O. Wilson2
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A. INTRODUCTION: WAYS OF UNDERSTANDING HUMAN NATURE AND ITS
RELATIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS. 
This essay takes as its starting point the concept of Der Mensch, which
refers to the biological classification of the human sub-species (homo
sapiens sapiens) among higher primates and specifically the family of the
anthropoids, in addition to its more general meaning of a “person.” That
biological understanding is broadened by the concept of Menschlichkeit or
humanity, from the Latin humanitas, which covers three meanings: the
biological existence of the species, the broader sense of the various moral
concepts of Enlightenment humanism, and the idea of humans’ inherent
ability to have compassion for other humans. Our inquiry builds on the
juxtaposition of Mensch und Recht, implying that human beings function
under the law and have rights as humans, hence the wordplay with
Menschenrechte or human rights. This juxtaposition invites a reflection on
1 This essay is a chapter to be published in Dirk Hanschel (ed.), Mensch und Recht:
Liber amicorum Eibe Riedel, 2013. The excellent research assistance of Sarah Raifman,
Rachel Sandlow-Ash and Vera Sistenich is gratefully acknowledged.
2 Edward O. Wilson, The Social Conquest of Earth, New York, London: W. W.
Norton & Co., 2012, p. 241.
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how a progressively expanding set of subjective rights deemed inherent in
all humans (human rights) relate to what we know about our nature as a
species (human nature). Or, how does our scientific understanding of
human nature relate to the legal and moral framework of human rights as it
has evolved, particularly over the last seventy years? 
This inquiry is not the result of an exhaustive study of such wide-
ranging, challenging and cross-disciplinary issues. It has no greater claim
than to suggest the potential value of a more sustained reflection. Such an
invitation to further research bridging the legal and natural sciences seems a
fitting tribute to Professor Eibe Riedel, who has ventured into these
territories on more than one occasion.3 His inquiring mind and astute legal
analysis should inspire others to take up the challenge to rethink human
rights in light of advances in scientific approaches to understanding human
nature.
It is rare to see this question posed in the human rights literature, which
tends to explain human rights as deriving from natural law or positive law
or both. Writings on the foundations of human rights tend not to inquire into
whether and how scientific studies on the essence of human-ness (through
biology and psychology) explain, if at all, the emergence of moral codes
such as human rights. Human rights studies tend to draw upon findings of
law, political science, public policy and philosophy. Jack Donnelly notes,
“few issues in moral or political philosophy are more contentious or
intractable than theories of human nature.”4 He distinguishes “the scientist’s
3 See, for example, Eibe Riedel, “The Constitution and Scientific and 
Technical Progress,” in: Christian Starck (ed.): New Challenges to the 
German Basic Law, Studien und Materialien zur 
Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, vol. 49. Nomos, Baden-Baden 1991, p. 61 - 85;
“On the Beginning of Life from a Constitutional Law Perspective. From the
Procreation to the Creation of a Human Being” (original title: Zum 
Lebensbeginn in verfassungsrechtlicher Sicht. Von der Zeugung zur 
Erzeugung des Menschen), in: Gentechnologie und Fortpflanzungsmedizin 
- Chancen und Risiken, rechtliche und rechtspolitische Fragen, München 
1989 (10 pp.);  “Gene Technology in the Area of Conflict between Law and
Ethics” (original title: Gentechnik im Spannungsfeld von Recht und Ethik), 
in: Alma Mater Philippina, Marburg 1991, p. 12 - 17; “Gene Technology 
and Embryo Protection as Constitutional Law and Regulatory Problems” 
(original title: Gentechnologie und Embryonenschutz als Verfassungs- und 
Regelungsprobleme), in: EuGRZ 1986, p. 469 - 478. 
4 Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd ed., Ithaca
and London, Cornell University Press, 2003, 16.
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human nature” (which “sets the ‘natural’ outer limits of human possibility”)
from “a moral vision of human nature” (according to which “human rights
set the limits and requirements of social (especially state) action.”5  He
describes human nature as “a social project more than a presocial given”
and thus is a “work of self-creation.”6 
This essay focuses on “the scientist’s human nature” and seeks to
reopen the question of the scientific basis for understanding the relationship
between human nature and human rights.  Rather than separating
experimental from speculative sciences, or biological sciences from moral
philosophy, I propose a more integrated effort to understand what scientific
investigation is defining as the “human” in need of protection through a
regime of rights.
This reluctance to introduce scientific approaches to human nature into
the study of human rights was not always the case. In the 17th and 18th
centuries, the study of natural philosophy or "the workings of nature" was
considered to include the concept of science as used in the 16th century and
earlier as a synonym for knowledge or study. It was also closely linked with
moral philosophy. In the 19th century the term “natural science” acquired
its current meaning of knowledge acquired through experiments and
empirical evidence and testing of hypotheses. This commingling and
eventual separation of natural and moral philosophy will be discussed in
section B. 
In section C, I will explore the idea that recent scientific investigation of
human nature through evolutionary biology and neuroscience clarifies the
theoretical foundation of human rights and provides a response to the
challenge of the early 19th century English legal theorist and founder of
utilitarianism Jeremy Bentham that, when confronted with the real word,
human rights understood as “natural rights” are “nonsense upon stilts.” This
section will rely heavily on a recent book, quoted in the epigraph above, by
Edward O. Wilson. Although many other biologists, psychologists,
anthropologists, neuroscientists and philosophers have written on the origin
of moral reasoning in ways that relate human nature to the assumptions of
contemporary human rights, the breadth and clarity of Wilson’s work amply
justify drawing on The Social Conquest of Earth to open the dialogue on
human nature and human rights. The conclusion in section D will evoke the
concept of a “new Enlightenment” and the potential for synthesizing
knowledge from biological and social sciences better to understand the
relationship between human nature and human rights. 
5 Donnelly (Fn. 4), 14.
6 Donnelly (Fn. 4), 15.
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B. THE ENLIGHTENMENT ASSUMPTION THAT HUMAN RIGHTS DERIVE FROM
HUMAN NATURE
1. Merging of Science and Human Rights in the Enlightenment
In the West, the theories of human rights that emerged in the 16 th and
17th centuries formed the intellectual basis of revolutionary movements that
generated declarations of rights, and at the same time were inseparable from
the scientific revolution. The concept of “natural philosophy” applied to the
scientific study of the physical and natural world. We are astounded today
by the intellectual breadth of Diderot and Voltaire or Franklin and
Jefferson, but their concern with astronomy, mathematics, chemistry,
mechanics, and the diversity of human experience across the globe was
integrated into their arguments for the Rights of Man. Thomas Paine
exemplified the spirit of that time when he argued that human rights derive
from human nature and that “[n]atural rights are those which appertain to
man in the right of his existence.”7
The great achievements of Bacon and Descartes in the 17th and 18th
centuries opened the way for innovation in mathematics, and experimental
methods, which were well known to the political philosophers of the day.
Through natural philosophy and natural rights, science and human rights
were born of the same spirit of empiricism and progress that characterized
the Enlightenment. In post-Enlightenment intellectual history human rights
developed through moral reasoning, philosophical and political thought and
legal theory and practice, with applications in the laws and institutions of
human governance, administration of justice, and theories of the state.
Natural Philosophy advanced through evolutionary biology, brain research,
neuroscience, behavioural psychology, and related sciences. 
The Enlightenment was indeed the critical period for science, medicine,
and human rights. Referring to the scientific and democratic revolutions,
Timothy Ferris in The Science of Liberty begins his study of this
convergence by affirming, “These two transformations were linked, and
remain so today: Every scientific nation in the world at the close of the
twentieth century was a liberal, or at least partly liberal, democracy
(meaning a state which guarantees human rights to its citizens, who elect
their leaders)”.8 He argues that these revolutions were not a coincidence, but
rather that science sparked the democratic revolution and “that science
7 Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man, first published in London by J.S. 
Jordan, 1791, New York, Penguin Classics, 1983, 68. 
8 Timothy Ferris, The Science of Liberty, Democracy, Reason, and the Law of
Nature, New York: HarperCollins, 2010, 1.
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continues to foster political freedom today.”9 
Aside from the possible fostering of political freedom by scientific
advancement, the Enlightenment represents both the affirmation of the
scientific method and the formulation of the human rights. The former
reflected faith in human progress while the latter defined standards of
freedom and equality on which the legitimacy of modern governments
would henceforth be judged. 
2. Development of Empirical Science in the 19th and 20th Century and
Implications for Human Rights
The application of empirical methods to both natural sciences (including
biology) and social sciences expanded significantly in the 19th century with
the emergence of thermodynamics, and electromagnetic theory, atomic
theory (developed by John Dalton), evolutionary biology (based on the
theory of natural selection in Darwin’s The Origin of Species), experimental
psychology (such as Wilhelm Wundt’s Principles of Physiological
Psychology and the work of people like James, Pavlov and Dewey) and
sociology (especially Emile Durkheim’s Rules of Sociological Method, as
well as the work of Marx, Weber and many others). The 19th century was
also a period in which science was applied to industry, revolutionized the
global economy and generated immense wealth. Per capita income
increased more than nine times form 1820 to 2001.10 
These extraordinary scientific developments were no longer conceived
as part of a common project of modernity, in which human progress would
advance with the simultaneous growth of science and industry, on the one
hand, the establishment of human rights as the end of government, on the
other. Unlike the scientific developments of the 17th and 18th centuries,
those of the 19th century were deeply rooted in experimental methods and
applications of advanced mathematics, without the need to sustain the
linkage between the “two transformations.” Indeed, the great economic
strides of industrialized Europe and North American, made possible through
advances in science and technology, were often achieved at the expense of
colonized peoples and oppressed workers, and thus at the expense of human
rights. Today globalization and the economic crises that accompany it,
continue to challenge the human rights of formerly colonized peoples, as
well as workers in the global North and South. 
9 Ferris (Fn. 8) 2. 
10 Angus Maddison, Growth and Interaction in the World Economy: The Roots of
Modernity, Washington D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute, 2005, 5. See also Angus
Maddison, Contours of the World Economy 1-2030 AD, Oxford University Press, 2007.
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The movements against slavery and the slave trade and for workers
rights in the 19th and early 20th centuries, against colonialism in mid-20th
century and against the harmful impacts of globalization and environmental
degradation in the early 21st century were successful to the extent that they
were able to challenge the economic interests that relied so much on
scientific progress. The technology that created and sustained the Industrial
Revolution seems to have reversed the Enlightenment approach to human
rights and advances in science and technology as two mutually reinforcing
dimensions of human progress.
This is not to say that scientific progress is necessarily detrimental to
human rights. On the contrary, the right to benefit from scientific progress
was proposed as a human right by the Committee on the Theoretical Bases
of Human Rights in 1947,11 and incorporated in Article 27 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and Article 15 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1966. Of course,
scientists have been active in human rights in a variety of ways12 but the
issue I wish to address is that they rarely draw implications for human rights
from their work.  This is due in large part to the fact that the connections are
not always evident and that most empirical scientists hesitate to take a
11 Such was the position taken in 1947 by the UNESCO-convened 
Committee on the Theoretical Bases of Human Rights, which sought to 
clarify the underlying concepts of the draft Universal Declaration. Its 
statement on the “Grounds of an International Declaration of Human 
Rights” of July 1947, included a “Right to Share in Progress” according to 
which “Every man has the right to full access the enjoyment of the technical
and cultural achievements of civilization.”Unesco, Human Rights: 
Comments and Interpretations. A Symposium Edited by Unesco, 
UNESCO/PHS/3(rev.), 25 July 1948, Appendix II, p. 14. The right was 
subsequently recognized in Article 25 of the UDHR and Article 25 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
12 Richard Pierre Claude, Science in the Service of Human Rights, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003; Carol Corillon, “The Role of 
Science and Scientists in Human Rights,” The ANNALS of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 506 (November 1989), pp. 
129-140. The American Association for the Advancement of Science 
(AAAS) currently hosts a Science of Human Rights Coalition, consisting of
scientific and engineering membership organizations, which facilitates 
“communication and partnerships on human rights within and across the 
scientific community, and between the scientific and human rights 
communities.” http://shr.aaas.org/coalition/index.shtml (Visited 16 August 
2012).
7
Liber amicorum Eibe Riedel
position on matters outside of their specialized fields. The next session
explores the human rights implications of twentieth century scientific
advances in understanding human nature, beginning with biology.
C. HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE ABOUT HUMAN
NATURE
Although a contested concept, “human nature” has been understood as a
combination of genetic and cultural factors determining human behaviour.
Wilson describes human nature as the “monster in the fever swamp of
public discourse,”13 but finds “that ample evidence, arising from multiple
branches of learning in the sciences and humanities, allows a clear
definition of human nature.”  His definition—which is an excellent starting
point for reflecting on the implications for human rights—is “the inherited
regularities of mental development common to our species,” and the result
of “the interaction of genetic and cultural evolution that occurred over a
long period in deep prehistory.”14 These interactions generate “epigenetic
rules” of psychological development, which, he is quick to point out “are
not genetically hardwired.”15 
Paul Ehrlich explains in Human Natures, “[h]uman natures are clearly the
result of biological and cultural evolution, and in some sense the ethical
feelings and behaviors that are part of our natures must have arisen through
these same processes.”16 He cautions, however, that only the capacity to
develop ethics, that is, to anticipate consequences, feel empathy, internalized
societal standards, and make moral choices, derives from human biology; “the
actual ethics, morals, and norms of a society—the products of that ethical
capacity—are overwhelmingly a result of cultural evolution within that
society.”17 
Scientific discussion of the tension in human nature between genetic vs.
cultural factors and between individual egoism and group identity has rarely
been linked to human rights. One of the papers presented to the Committee
on the Theoretical Bases of Human Rights in 1947 dealt with human rights
protection of individuals in tension with that of groups from the biological
perspective. R. W. Gerard, professor of physiology at the University of
13 Wilson (Fn. 2), 191.
14 Wilson (Fn. 2), 192.
15 Wilson (Fn. 2). 194.
16 Paul R. Ehrlich, Human Natures: Genes, Cultures, and the Human Prospect.
Washington, D.C.: Island Press/Shearwater Books, 2000, p. 308.
17 Ehrlich (Fn. 16), 308-309.
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Chicago, wrote, “The central problem of man in society is that of outlining
the territory of the individual within the larger territory of the group. …
This is the inescapable dichotomy: each man (and his neighbour) is a
complete whole, dedicated to self-survival and in basic competition with
other men; but each man (and his neighbour) is a component unit of a larger
whole, the society, and dedicated to group survival by basic cooperation
with other men in that group.”18 This simple fact has implications for human
rights. According to Gerard, “Man’s rights and duties, then, cannot be
absolute but remain always relative to his milieu…The ‘rights of man’ are
attempts to define the territory of the individual (or the small group) vis-à-
vis his neighbours and larger groups.”19 Affirming that “social evolution
cannot violate general laws of biological evolution,” he acknowledges that
“the biologist cannot supply details of what present human rights should
be.”20 Nevertheless, he assesses human rights from a biological perspective
by reiterating several general laws of biological evolution, including:
Greater dependence of the individual on the group is in the line with
evolution. Altruism is growing relative to selfishness… Any
doctrine which regards man only as an individual or only as a unit in
a group is necessarily false.  The duality of man, as an individual
whole and as a social unit, is inescapable. The extremes of
eudemonism and utilitarianism, individualism and collectivism,
anarchism and totalitarianism, laissez-faire and absolute economic
socialism are untenable. The rights of man involve rights of the
individual (or small group) as against other individuals (or groups)
or the whole society – which implies duties of them to him – and
rights of the whole  (or small group) as against the individual (or
group) – which implies duties of him to it.21
In that same symposium, international lawyer Quincy Wright began his
reflections by noting that “biologists tell us that all men share with the
higher animals desires of varying intensity for life, for food, for sex, and for
dominance. The psychologists add the desire for home territory, for
personal freedom, for movement and for society.”22 He concluded, [h]uman
18 R. W. Gerard, “The Rights of Man: A Biological Approach,” in Jacques Maritain,
ed., Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations, London/New York, Allan Wingate
[Originally issued as UNESCO Doc. PHS/3 (rev.)],  205-206. 
19 Gerard (Fn. 18), 206-207.
20 Gerard (Fn. 18), 208.
21 Gerard (Fn. 18), 208-209.
22 Quincy Wright, “Relationship between Different Categories of Human Rights, in
Maritain (Fn. 18), 143.
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rights can only be defined if due consideration is given both to the original
nature of man and to the contemporary standards of world civilization.”23 
Since then, enormous progress has been made in evolutionary biology
and neuroscience but little attention has been devoted to the question of
whether these scientific fields clarify the relation between the scientific
understanding of human nature and the impact of that understanding on
theories of human rights. Evolutionary biology and neuroscience
accomplished major breakthroughs in the 20th century but the training and
institutional settings of the scientists involved rarely offered the occasion to
engage with moral philosophers, international and constitutional lawyers,
and political scientists, as they did in 1947.
Evolutionary biology is a particularly rich field from the human
rights perspective insofar as it explores the extent to which behaviour
assumed to be essential to human rights (such as avoiding harm to others,
treating other as equals) is explained by inherited genes or by socialisation.
It also examines whether human morality serves a purpose in natural
selection. Echoing Gerard’s “inescapable dichotomy,” Wilson finds the
following “iron rule in genetic social evolution”: “Selfish individuals beat
altruistic individuals, while groups of altruists beat groups of selfish
individuals.”24 It is “natural” for humans to take from others and to kill
other humans whenever there is an advantage, including on a mass scale.
Like all social species, humans function in hierarchical relations with other
humans. The propensity to accept hierarchical social structures is innate in
humans. What does this dimension of “human nature” tell us about the
problems of equality and violence in human rights terms?
1. The Problem of Equality and Non-discrimination
This combination of a genetically inherited propensity and a socially-
determined behaviour challenges the claim of most human rights documents
that “all human beings are born equal.” This concept was addressed in the
canonical texts of the Eighteenth century revolutions, beginning with the
American Declaration of Independence (“all men are created equal”) and in
Article 1 of the French Declaration of 1789, identical to that of 1791: “Men
are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions may be
founded only upon the general good.”  In Anarchical Fallacies, Jeremy
Bentham’s scathing critique of the 1791 Declaration, he said regarding this
article:  
All men are born free? All men remain free? No, not a single man:
23 Wright (Fn. 22), 151.
24 Wilson (Fn. 2), 243.
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not a single man that ever was, or is, or will be. All men, on the
contrary, are born in subjection, and the most absolute subjection--the
subjection of a helpless child to the parents on whom he depends every
moment for his existence. … All men born free? Absurd and miserable
nonsense!  ... All men are born equal in rights. The rights of the heir of
the most indigent family equal to the rights of the heir of the most
wealthy? … All men (i.e. all human creatures of both sexes) remain
equal in rights. … The apprentice, then, is equal in rights to his master;
…  So again as between wife and husband. The madman has as good a
right to confine anybody else, as anybody else has to confine him.25 
This diatribe goes on at length (and Bentham’s Anarchical Fallacies
contains much more in this vein on this and each of the articles of the
French Declaration) and includes his famous assessment of “natural rights”
as “simple nonsense” and “natural and imprescriptible rights” as “rhetorical
nonsense--nonsense upon stilts.”26 From the “laws of nature,” he explained,
“come imaginary rights, a bastard brood of monsters.”27 
Was Bentham’s critique a reflection of a finding of evolutionary biology
that humans are hierarchical? Clearly humans are born unequal in status,
property, genetic endowments, access to the social determinants of good
health and in numerous other aspects.  An yet the Universal Declaration’s
opening article reads “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity
and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” 
The claim that equality derives from human nature constitutes what
Bentham called an anarchical fallacy. He argued, “[t]here are no such things
as natural rights—no such things as rights anterior to the establishment of
government—no such things as natural rights opposed to, in contra-
distinction to, legal rights.”
Bentham criticizes natural law because it confuses what ought to be
with what is and thus commits the “naturalistic fallacy” in the common
sense of the expression.28 The critique holds insofar as it rejects the
assertion that a behaviour (e.g., treating people equally) is a human right
25 Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of the 
Declarations of Rights Issued During the French Revolution, in The Works 
of Jeremy Bentham published under the superintendence of his Executor, 
John Browning, vol. two, New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1962, 
[originally published in 1843], 498-499.
26 Bentham (Fn. 25), 501
27 Bentham (Fn. 25), 523.
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because it corresponds to a theoretical state of nature (e.g., all humans are
born equal). It is both factually wrong that humans are born equal and
morally dangerous to want to make a right out of what occurs naturally.
Slavery, genocide, patriarchy, and discrimination based on class, sex, caste,
social origin, ethnicity, language or religion occur “naturally” in human
societies. It is clear therefore that the current corpus of human rights has not
relied on the idea that what humans are known to do with sufficient
regularity as to be their “natural” behaviour merits being enshrined as a
“natural” right. 
Part of the confusion stems from the concept of the “state of nature,” as
defined by Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Hume, that is, the condition of
early man before the state, laws and other constraints under the social
contract. Although this state of nature is pure speculation of Enlightenment
philosophers, it is extraordinary the extent to when their descriptions
resemble that of more recent paleontology. Consider how Rousseau
described the “savage”: “Accustomed from their infancy to the
inclemencies of the weather and the rigour of the seasons, inured to fatigue,
and forced, naked and unarmed, to defend themselves and their prey from
other ferocious animals or to escape them by flight, men would acquire a
robust and almost unalterable constitution.”29 Under the state of nature, man
has “natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything he tries to get and
succeeds in getting,” which he gives up in the social contract in exchange
for “civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses.”30 
Human rights have been based on the assumption of the perfectibility of
human society and that altering behaviour based on moral precepts is
possible through law and education, what Donnelly calls “a self-fulfilling
moral prophecy.”31 Thus it is not the observed nature of humans (unequal at
birth, in competition with other individual, prone to violence) but the
morally preferable nature than matters (equality, respecting other
individuals). At the level of the group, altruism is “natural” in some
circumstances but does not ipso facto provide a basis for human rights
28 The naturalistic fallacy also understood in philosophy as the error of assuming,
because some thing or act has a property, such as being pleasant, and pleasantness is good,
that therefore the thing or act in question is always good. Such was the position of the
philosopher G. E. Moore in his 1903 book Principia Ethica. 
29 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, originally published
1755, quoted from The Social Contract and Discourses, translated by G.D.H. Cole, ed. By
P. D. Jimack, London, Orion Publishing, 1993, 53.
30 Rousseau (Fn. 29), 196.
31 Donnelly (Fn. 4), 15.
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norms.
According to Wilson, “A basic element of human nature is that people
feel compelled to join groups and, having joined, consider them superior to
competing groups.”32 This feature of human nature is acknowledged in the
“the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association,”33 which is
reaffirmed in all general human rights texts. In order to reduce the
consequences of the propensity of members of the group to consider their
group superior to others and to compete, there is a concomitant human right
that no human right, including freedom of association, “may be interpreted
as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any
activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any’ other right.”34
The juxtaposition of these two principles of human rights (freedom of
association and non-use of a right to destroy other rights) is in the logic of
human rights. It respects the need of humans to associate with other
humans, while protecting the weaker groups from potential harm from
competing groups that would deny the very right to exist of the weaker
group. 
The problem of equality and non-discrimination thus brings into focus
the importance of constantly distinguishing what is considered morally
good from what is observable in nature. Human rights set a high standard of
equality, which assumes that humans can overcome traits of domination that
have served individuals in natural selection but which are, in the logic of
human rights, contrary to the longer-term interests of groups.
2. Cooperation and Competition among Human Groups
To understand the extent to which it is “natural” for humans to aspire
toward cooperation and mutual respect (or to “act towards one another in a
spirit of brotherhood” in the language of the UDHR), we need to inquire
into the concepts of altruism and empathy. These behaviours can be
explained in evolutionary terms as a result of the advantage derived by the
group where certain individuals sacrifice reproductive potential in the
interest of the group, in contrast to populations in which all individuals
pursue selfish interests. While selfishness is truly a feature of inherited
individual behaviour, altruism is also deeply inbedded in human nature.
Evolutionary biology teaches us that altruism emerged as cooperation
within the in-group and as hostility toward the out-group. 
32 Wilson (Fn. 2), 290.
33 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), article 20.
34 UDHR, article 30.
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Altruism had been explained by the “inclusive fitness theory,”
developed by William Hamilton and others in a 1964 articles in the Journal
of Theoretical Biology. The theory holds that the genes for altruism could
evolve if relatedness or kinship (r) makes the benefit to the individual (B) of
an action exceed the cost (C) to the individual, expressed in the formula rB
> C. This inclusive fitness theory prevailed for three decades until several
scientists, including Wilson, reconsidered it in the 1990s because the
mathematics did not work out and empirical evidence could not be
produced to support it.35 Wilson replaces it with standard models of
population genetics.
I n The Social Conquest of Earth, Wilson explains the concept of
eusociality (the highest level of social organisation), that is, the complex
social system of a limited number of species, like ants, termites, wasps and
humans, that “divide labor in what outwardly at least appears to be an
altruistic manner,”36 creating superorganisms having a comparative
advantage over other organisms. His explanation of altruism and thus of
moral behaviour is that “[h]man beings are prone to be moral—do the right
thing, hold back, give aid to others, sometimes even at personal risk—
because natural selection has favored those interactions of groups members
benefitting the group as a whole.”37 
Cooperation is even more important for him in that it favours groups
with a higher proportion of co-operators over other groups. His conclusion
on this point holds considerable potential for clarifying the relationship
between human nature and human rights: “we [humans] are unique among
animals in the degree that we attend to the sick and injured, help the poor,
comfort the bereaved, and even willingly risk our own lives to save
strangers.”38 In sum, “authentic altruism is based on a biological instinct for
the common good of the tribe, put in place by group selection, wherein
groups of altruists in prehistoric times prevailed over groups of individuals
in selfish disarray.”39 
From this perspective, it is not difficult to see the motivation behind
such human rights standards as the right of everyone “to a standard of living
35 Wilson (Fn. 2), 167-182. The story of the controversy surrounding Wilson
recantation of inclusive fitness is told in Jonah Lehrer, “Kin and Kind: A fight about the
genetics of altruism”, The New Yorker, March 5, 2012, p. 40-42.
36 Wilson (Fn. 2), 109.
37 Wilson (Fn. 2), 247.
38 Wilson (Fn. 2), 250.
39 Wilson (Fn. 2), 251.
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adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family,
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances
beyond his control.” (UDHR, Article 25). This norm, and the more detailed
enumeration of economic, social and cultrual rights in human rights treaties,
was not drafted with natural selection in mind but in effect favours the
“authentic altrusim” to which Wilson refers. 
3. The Problem of Violence
On the subject of violent behaviour in human evolution, Sam Harris
explains in The Moral Landscape, “Human evil is a natural phenomenon,
and some level of predatory violence is innate in us.”40 In The Better Angels
of Our Nature, Steven Pinker discusses the “dark side of Human Nature.”41
He identifies raw exploitation, dominance, revenge, a n d ideology as
dimensions of human nature that militate toward violence. Pinker thinks
ideology might be the biggest contributor to violence, especially on a large
scale. Rape, plunder, conquest, and the elimination of rivals have been part
of a natural drive toward dominance. His book has its detractors but clearly
poses the core problem of human nature and human rights and documents
the dramatic decline of violence over the centuries in all parts of the world,
as measured by deaths through genocide, war, human sacrifice, and
homicide and by behavior such as torture, slavery, and the treatment of
racial minorities, women, children, and animals. Other behaviours reflect a
thirst for revenge that can take the form of vendettas, rough justice, and
cruel punishments. 
Pinker further finds countervailing traits of human nature in self-control,
empathy, the moral sense, and reason. Among the trends that he considers
as having moderated these forms of violence is what he calls the “Rights
Revolution” and the “Humanitarian Revolution.” These events as described
by Pinker are related to but not coterminous with contemporary human
rights and humanitarian law. The point is worth pondering from the human
rights perspective: Human societies have made considerable progress in
creating and enforcing human rights and humanitarian norms, which
perhaps exemplify the potential imbedded in human nature to restrain
ourselves from violence and other behaviours harmful to what we value in
human existence. 
40 Sam Harris, The Moral Landscape. How Science Can Determine 
Human Values, New York, Free Press, 2010, 100.
41 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels Of Our Nature: How Violence Has
Declined, New York: Viking Press, 2011.
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Wilson explains that “our bloody nature … is ingrained because group-
versus-groups was a principal driving force that made us what we are”42 and
“war and genocide have been universal and eternal, respecting no particular
time or culture.”43 For Wilson, a lesson from the study of the biological
origins of moral reasoning is that all agree that genocide, slavery, and child
abuse “should be opposed everywhere without exception”.44 Of course all of
these are clearly banned without exception in human rights texts and
implementation mechanisms. 
Pinker, Harris and Wilson share the view that our species is capable of
rising above our violent nature, our dark side, through moral codes and
enforcement of law. From this perspective, we can consider whether the
human rights norms governing violent acts are legitimate and reasonable
instruments to fulfil moral preferences emerging collectively in our species.
Consider the rights to life and security of person (Article 3 of the UDHR),
or the prohibition of slavery or servitude (Article 4), or the ban on torture or
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 5), or the
1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide Convention, or the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence against Women. These provisions refer to behaviours that are
“natural” in human history but that all governments participating in the
United Nations agree to eliminate.  In other words, the promotion and
protection of human rights reflect efforts to change behaviours deeply
embedded in human nature.
Marc Hauser, one of the best known scholars in the field of moral
psychology (and who resigned from his faculty position at Harvard
University in 2011 following an internal investigation that found him
responsible for scientific misconduct, apparently not related to his work in
Moral Minds) seems to acknowledge the value of such developments when
he refers to “the positive effects of organizations such as the United Nations
[where] we see the spread of particularly virtuous moral attitudes.”45 He
concludes, “It is thus possible for some groups to facilitate the spread of
what many consider universal rights.”46 
42 Wilson (Fn. 2), 62.
43 Wilson (Fn. 2), 65.
44 Wilson (Fn. 2), 254.
45 Marc Hauser, Moral Minds. The Nature of Right and Wrong, New York,
HarperCollins, 2006, 311.
46 Hauser (Fn. 45), 311.
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D. CONCLUSION: A NEW ENLIGHTENMENT FOR UNDERSTANDING THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN HUMAN NATURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
The relationship between human nature and human rights was essential
to the emergence of modernity during the Enlightenment insofar as human
rights were deemed to derive from human nature. That relationship has
evolved radically in the sense that most human rights seek to limit
behaviours that are regarded constant features of human nature. 
A more nuanced interpretation of this relationship might consider
individual autonomy and freedom as aspirations deriving from the egoist in
human nature, the selfish individual seeking procreative advantage. These
traits reflect underlying concerns of many civil and political rights. Those
traits that translate into behaviours of cooperation and concern for others
derive from altruism and empathy in human nature, and find expression in
economic, social and cultural rights. While this categorization of rights has
its limits,47 there is a common recognition in the legal formulation of human
rights and in the biological understanding of human nature that humans are
self-centred and aspire to enjoy freedom, on the one hand, and
compassionate and willing to accept duties toward others, on the other.
Developments in biology, psychology and neuroscience are shedding light
on the biological origins of moral reasoning such that we can now consider
that it is consistent with human nature for societies to formulate and protect
human rights aimed at altering human behaviour. 
In discussing violence above, we noted that Wilson listed condemnation
of slavery, child abuse, and genocide as the “clearest ethical precepts” on
which all agree and that this list could be expanded “with deepened self-
awareness” to “precepts shared by most societies” which “will stand the test
of biology-based realism.”48 But he added that outside of these “there is a
grey domain inherently difficult to navigate” and about which inquiry into
the biological history “has not been done.  In fact, it is seldom even
imagined.”49  He anticipates that such issues as gay rights, contraception and
forced marriage will not “stand the test of biological realism.”50 
The record of human rights bodies dealing with these and many other
47 I have argued elsewhere that this categorization has outlived its usefulness and that
a more holistic and integrated understanding of human rights is preferable. Stephen P.
Marks, “The Past and Future of the Separation of Human Rights into Categories,”
Maryland Journal of International Law, vol. 24 (2009),  208-241.
48 Wilson (Fn. 2), 254
49 Wilson (Fn. 2), 254.
50 Wilson (Fn. 2), 254.
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issues in the “grey domain” turns out to be more promising than Wilson
anticipates, whether we consider the Convention on Consent to Marriage,
Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, which entered
into fore in 1964, the Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of
International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity drafted in 2006,51 or the UN Declaration on Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity, or progress in reproductive and sexual
rights since the Cairo International Conference on Population and
Development in 1994.52 
No one claims that these matters are settled, as is evident from the
deliberations of the Human Rights Council. Nevertheless, civil society and
international bodies have produced considerable normative clarity beyond
Wilson’s “clearest ethical precepts.” The work of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, where Eibe Reidel has played an
outstanding role since 2003, has dealt with many matters in the “grey
domain,” although without submitting to the “test of biological realism.” To
the extent that emerging human rights norms challenge behaviours common
to human societies for millennia (such as gender stereotyping,
discrimination, inequality in access to basic goods, violence), it is not an
exaggeration to consider that they seek to reverse the course of human
nature. 
Several natural scientists have addressed the deep origins of moral
reasoning and, by implication, of human rights. Alex Walter writes in “The
Anti-Naturalistic Fallacy” that an evolutionary study of morality would
enable us to investigate “how people came to acquire ethical concepts…
how they make ethical judgments…and how they construct ethical
systems,” as well as to “derive new ethical principles from a combination of
newly discovered facts and already accepted normative principles”; an
evolutionary study of ethics could “explain meta-ethics, i.e. provide the
foundation that underlies our ethical beliefs and behavior,” and possibly
“justify new and different ethical norms.”53
Hauser found that “[o]ur moral faculty is equipped with a universal
moral grammar, a toolkit for building specific moral systems.”54 He further
51 See http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org (visited 6 August 2012.)
52 A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1 -- Report of the International Conference on Population
and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1 (1994).
53 Alex Walter, "The Anti-naturalistic Fallacy: Evolutionary Moral Psychology and
the Insistence of Brute Facts," Evolutionary Psychology 4 (2006): 33-48.
54 Hauser (Fn. 45), xviii. (Emphasis in the original.)
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explains that “an unconscious and universal moral grammar underlies our
judgments of right and wrong.”55 He considers that many failed policies in
law, politics, business and education result from “our ignorance about the
nature of our moral instincts.”56 Natural selection does not provide the answer
to moral behaviour as “there aren’t enough genes to code the various required
behaviors” but rather “cultural evolution is the source of ethics”57 and,
therefore, of human rights.
In what is perhaps the only work by a neuroscientist that places his
scientific field squarely in the context of human rights, Jean-Pierre Changeux
in The Physiology of Truth explicitly draws on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and other human rights texts to claim that “The development of
science has led, indirectly, to a gradual recognition of human rights.”58 At the
conclusion of his study, he proposes an ambitious intercultural dialogue on
ethical questions, the purpose of which would be “to discover and explain the
aspirations and beliefs of human beings—in short, their mental states and
expectations of reward—[and bring] about the good life that all human beings
desire … [and to achieve] a more harmonious balance between the rights of
the individual and the needs of human society.”59  Essentially, Changeux
proposes an advisory committee, under UN auspices, to draw on the sciences,
particularly the biological and medical sciences, to address ethical issues and
make recommendations regarding “actual causes of human suffering in a
detailed and practical way.”60
It is accepted in the biological study of human nature, as Ehrlich put it,
that “[h]uman beings are the only animals that have developed religions,
ethics, moral codes, and mutually agreed-on norms of conduct. These are
human universals, but micro- and macroevolution have combined to
produce a multitude of forms in different societies.”61 Thus, those who study
human nature might benefit from introducing explicit knowledge of human
rights norms into their reflections on moral codes as products of human
self-reflection. As Hauser suggested, “Inquiry into our moral nature will no
55 Hauser (Fn. 45), xviii .
56 Hauser (Fn. 45), xx.
57 Ehrlich (Fn. 16), 317.
58 Jean-Pierre Changeux, The Physiology of Truth. Neuroscience and Human
Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002, 236. 
59 Changeux (Fn. 58), 261-262.
60 Changeux (Fn. 58), 263.
61 Ehrlich (Fn. 16), 256.
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longer be the proprietary province of the humanities and social sciences, but
a shared journey with the natural sciences.”62 
The principal claim of this essay is that such research will enhance our
understanding of human rights and human nature if pursued rigorously.
Without there being a need for the body Changeux proposes (which seems
to be a mix of the current International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO
and the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee), there is ample room
for more research drawing on emerging knowledge in the life sciences,
social sciences, neuroscience, humanities and psychology about human
nature with explicit reference to the implication so for human rights.  This is
the first argument Wilson makes for a “new Enlightenment.”63 His second
argument is equally compelling: “The planet we have conquered is not just
a stop along the way to a better world out there in some other dimensions.
Surely one moral precept we can agree on is to stop destroying our
birthplace, the only home humanity will ever have.”64 
The genius of the Enlightenment was the synthesis of knowledge in
ways that had major impacts on human affairs, principal among which were
scientific progress and defining and enforcing human rights. A new
Enlightenment would mean an intellectual reconnecting of moral
philosophy regarding human rights and extraordinary advances in scientific
understand of human nature. The challenges of climate change, genomics,
nanotechnology, green energy, robotics, neuroscience, to name but a few
areas of extraordinary developments of this century, call for such a new
Enlightenment. The 18th century Enlightenment was the launching pad of
modern scientific method and of modern government respectful of human
rights. Three hundred years later, there is much to be gained by restoring the
willingness to cross disciplinary boundaries and seek new insights regarding
the human condition.
62 Hauser (Fn.  45), 425.
63 Wilson (Fn. 2), 289-291.
64 Wilson (Fn. 2), 294.
